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SURGICALLY IMPLANTED MEDICAL DEVICE LIABILITY: WILL
THE NEW RESTATEMENT HELP THE UNRAVELING SHIELD
CREATED BY MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHHJ
I.

INTRODUCTION

Representing a plaintiff in medical device litigation against the device manufacturer prior to 1996 probably felt like David preparing to
meet Goliath. l The 1996 preemption analysis utilized by the United
States Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 2 paved the way for
various state actions to survive federal law preemption. 3 However,
questions remain regarding the reach of Lohr, which arguably dealt
with only one aspect of a complex regulatory scheme. 4
This Comment begins by guiding the reader through the rationale
for device control, the various levels of control based upon the presumed risks of device use, and the specific statutory provisions that
preempt state law. 5 Knowledge of these concepts is essential to understanding device use liability implications as the various controls create
the legal duties imposed under federal law and regulation-duties
that are not to be preempted by state law. 6
Medical devices are classified into three categories, Class I, Class II
and Class III respectively, with each class subjected to greater regulatory control due to the potential risks associated with use. 7 After
briefly discussing Class I and II devices, the Comment focuses on Class
III medical devices as they create the gravest risk of injury from failure, and are the class of devices most often utilized in surgical
procedures. s
Subsequent to presenting the medical device preemption language,
the Comment provides a brief history of preemption principles, and
reviews how the Supreme Court originally analyzed similar statutory
language. 9 In addition, in this section, the Comment provides an
overview of pre-Lohr Fourth Circuit preemption holdings, which essentially closed the door to seeking redress for device failure. lo
1. See infra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the likelihood
of preemptive claims prior to a landmark 1996 Supreme Court case.
2. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
3. See id. at 489.
4. See infra note 176.
5. See infra Parts II.A-B.
6. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory
preemption language.
7. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
8. See infra Part 1I.B.2.
9. See infra Part III.B.1.
10. See infra Part III.B.2.
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The Comment then exposes the new difficulties created in preemption analysis by providing a close, dissected look at Lohr. II In Lohr, the
United States Supreme Court struggled to agree on the appropriate
analysis, and deviated from precedent to reach a conclusion that provided the plaintiffs with a small opportunity for remedy.I2 Once
presenting a framework for application of the Lohr opinion, the Comment individually examines the various causes of action related to surgically implanted medical device use. I3 The Comment focuses on
how courts within the Fourth Circuit handle claims of preemption
post-Lohr, and liability analyses falling outside of the preemptive
scope. 14 Emphasis is placed upon manufacturing liability, although
some interrelated discussions of downstream liability are presented. I5
Legal principles advanced by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liabilityl6 ("Restatement (Third)") are woven into this discussionP For
the most part the new Restatement does not depart significantly from
the principles applied in products liability litigation within the Fourth
Circuit. Is However, the new standard raises the bar to attach strict
liability for injury due to defective design or manufacturing, although
pro-technology might render the harmed person without recourse if
adopted. 19
II.

UNDERSTANDING THE INTRICATE MEDICAL DEVICE STATUTORY SCHEME

Because medical devices move through interstate commerce, the
federal government has great latitude to exert statutory control. 20 As
with any federally controlled industry, it is important to understand
the reach of the specific statutory provisions and corresponding
regulations. 21
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.

See infra Part lII.C.
See infra Part III.C.3.
See infra Parts IV.A-D.
See infra Parts IV.A-F.
See infra Parts IV.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts 1I1.C-D.
United States v. Depilation Epilator Model No. DP-206 Universal Tech.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Congress may
regulate medical devices that are sold and distributed among the several
states).
See, e.g., Merrit B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives:
A Therny o/Section J6(b), 92 MICH. L. REv. 2088,2096 (1994) (discussing the
importance of understanding the reach of statutes and regulations in securities law).
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The Federal Statutory Scheme: The Food and Drug Act of 1906 Through
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976

Since the early days of federalism, the several states have enjoyed
significant latitude in regulating matters affecting the health and
safety of their individual citizens. 22 Under their policing power, states
could legislate, as necessary, to protect the health, lives and limbs of
all persons residing within their borders. 23 Industrialization and technological advances, however, opened the door for trade via interstate
commerce, and therefore, the ability for the federal government to
become increasingly involved in state affairs. 24
Although the role of Congress in regulating interstate commerce
changed over the years,25 Congress began to significantly impact the
regulation of health matters by enacting the Food and Drug Act of
1906 ("1906 Act").26 This legislation established a broad prohibition
against the manufacture of any adulterated or misbranded food or
drug placed in the stream of interstate commerce, or the actual shipment through interstate commerce of such an item. 27
As legitimate health-care entities competed against charlatans to
promote their new "state-of-the-art" medical devices, Congress identified a need to expand the 1906 Act to offer additional protection
from the sale of unsafe medical devices. 28 Consequently, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) ,
broadening the scope of protection to include misbranded or adulterated medical devices. 29
Meanwhile, within the health-care industry, technological advances
were leading to an increase in the types and sophistication of healthcare products entering the market. 30 These products had no govern22. Stanley E. Cox, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 50 OK. L. REv. 155,220 (1997).
23. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (citing Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
24. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Source of the Commerce Power, 73
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1399-1454 (1987) (discussing the history offederal regulation of interstate commerce as society advanced through the years).

25. Id.
26. 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
27. See id.
28. See S. Rep. No. 94-33 (1975) (noting in section II that the 1930s reformers
sought legislation to protect against "unsafe or quack devices").
29. 52 Stat. lO49-51 (1938).
30. In 1938, when the FDCA was enacted, most medical devices were relatively
simplistic, employing basic scientific concepts. Trained medical personnel
who utilized these devices could often detect if the device was malfunctioning. Legislative concern was focused upon truthful advertising resulting in
an emphasis on labeling requirements. In the 1960s, the focus shifted from
fraudulent devices to hazards associated with legitimate medical device use.
This was prompted by the increased complexity of medical devices such as
heart pacemakers, kidney dialysis units, and artificial heart valves. Because
of the sophisticated technology utilized, skilled medical personnel were no
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mental control beyond the parameters of misbranding or adulteration. 31 Despite advantages to health-care advancements, the
American public suffered :harm resulting from these new sophisticated medical devices that were marketed as safe and effective for
use. 32
In response to the mounting concern regarding public health and
safety from consumer groups as well as legislators,33 Congress enacted
the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to regulate device
safety and effectiveness, including the entrance of medical devices
into the stream of commerce. 34 Recognizing that medical devices,
based upon their design and use, presented the potential for gradations of harm, the MDA provided a classification system subjecting
each device class to increasingly stricter regulatory contro1. 35

B.

Different Standards Based Upon Risk Potential

1.

Classification System

Under the statute, Congress authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services ("Secretary"),36 in conjunction with expert panels,37

3l.

32.

33.

34.
35.
36.

37.

longer able to determine if a device was defective or not. See S. Rep. No. 9433, pt. II, at 1 (1975).
The FDCA additionally expanded public protection by providing for a
premarket review process for new drugs. The statute required the submission of an application, including investigational reports, which became effective sixty days after filing. Once the dru~ became effective, it could be
introduced into interstate commerce unless It was determined by the Secretary of Agriculture that the drug was unsafe for its intended use. Interestingly, these same protections were not implemented for new medical
devices entering the market. See § 505, 52 Stat. 1052.
In 1969, Dr. Theodore Cooper, Director of the National Heart and Lung
Institute, headed a panel that searched scientific literature and found a
recorded 10,000 injuries including 731 deaths from medical devices. For
example, heart valves caused 512 deaths and 300 injuries, pacemakers
caused 89 deaths and .186 injuries, and intrauterine devices caused 10
deaths and 8,000 injuries. See S. Rep. No. 94-33, pt. II, at 6 (1975).
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee held hearings over a twoday period in 1973 when previous medical device legislation was introduced. Testimony from various industrial, professional and consumer
groups reflected agreement regarding the need for medical device legislation. See S. Rep. No. 94-33, pt. III, at 7 (1975) (providing a synopsis of the
previous testimony).
Medical Device Amendments of 1976,90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1976».
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994).
21 U.S.C. § 321 (d) (referring to the Secretary of Health and Human Services). The Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
was subsequently empowered to perform the "[£Junctions vested in the Secretary under the [FDCA]." 21 C.F.R. § 5.IO(a)(I).
The FDA is charged to appoint experts to the panel who are qualified to
evaluate device safety and 'effectiveness because of their experience in developing, manufacturing or utilizing such medical devices. The FDA is further required to ensure that there is a diverse range of expertise, such as
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to classify devices into one of three categories. 38 Class I is reserved for
medical devices that are not used to support or sustain human life and
do not present an unreasonable risk of illness or injury.39 For example, medical devices such as ice bags, examination gloves, patient
scales, crutches, non-electric wheelchairs, and hand-crank hospital
beds receive Class I status. 40
More complex devices such as diagnostic x-ray machines, magnetic
resonance imaging machines, electrocardiograph equipment, electric
heating pads, electric wheelchairs and electric hospital beds fall within
Class IIY These devices receive Class II designation because additional regulatory control42 is necessary to ensure device safety and
effectiveness. 43
Finally, Class III is reserved for those devices that are life-supporting, life-sustaining or create a potentially unreasonable risk of harm.44
Class III devices include hip prosthesis, pacemakers, intraocular
lenses, pedicle screw fixation devices, inflatable penile prosthesis,
heart valves, monitors to detect heart irregularities, anti-choking suction devices, silicone breast implants, and artificial knee joints. 45

2.

Medical Device Controls

Each class is subjected to different regulatory controls designed to
"provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the
device."46 Safety and effectiveness are determined by evaluating the
intended user, the conditions of use, and by balancing the probable
benefits against the probable risk of injury or illness. 47

38.

39.
40.
4l.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

within areas of medicine, engineering, biology, and physics. In addition,
expert panels must include nonvoting members who represent the views of
both consumers and the manufacturing industry. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2).
See id. § 360c(b)(1)(B) (providing power to classify all devices except those
classified under subsection (f».
Id. § 360c(a) (1) (A).
21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6050 (ice bag), 880.6250 (examination gloves), 880.2720
(scale), 890.3150 (crutches), 890.3850 (wheelchair), 880.5120 (hospital
bed).
21 C.F.R. §§ 892.1680 (x-ray), 892.1000 (MRI), 870.2340 (EKG), 890.5740
(heating pad), 890.3860 (powered wheelchair), 880.5100 (adjustable bed).
See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
See id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3925 (valves), 870.1025 (heart arrhythmia detector),
874.5350 (suction device), 878.3530 (implant), 888.3480 (knee joint).
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i); see also id. § 360c(a)(1) (A)-(C) (addressing
Class I devices in subsection (A), Class II devices in subsection (B), and
Class III devices in subsection (C».
See id. § 360c(a) (2) (A)-(C).

394

a.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

General Controls

All medical devices are subjected to "general controls."48 These include specified good manufacturing practices (GMP) , labeling requirements, and certain standards for registration, notification,
record keeping and reporting. 49 In addition, federal statutes prohibit
the manufacturing and introduction into interstate commerce of
medical devices that are adulterated or misbranded. 50 Most Class I
devices are exempt from additional regulatory controls because the
"general controls" are adequate enough to ensure device safety and
effectiveness. 51
Some Class 152 and the remaining Class II and III devices are subjected to quality system GMP regulations that set forth quality control
standards. These standards include requirements to control device
design, monitor production processes, utilize sufficient numbers of
trained personnel who adhere to certain health and cleanliness standards and perform quality audits. 53

b.

Special Controls

In addition, Class II and III devices are subject to "special controls"
because the general controls alone are deemed insufficient to reason48. Id. § 360c(a) (l)(A).
49. See, e.g., id. §§ 360j(f) (empowering the Secretary to prescribe regulations
for pre-production design validation, manufacturing controls, packing,
storage and installation of devices to assure safety and effectiveness), § 360
(b), (c), U> (requiring each medical device manufacturer to submit an initial and annual registration, including at the time of submission, a copy of
the device label and packaging insert), § 360h(a) (2) (requiring health professionals to notify patients treated with a certain medical device of a risk
presented by the device and the necessary action to reduce or eliminate the
risk), § 360i(a)-(b) (requiring manufacturers to maintain records and reports with respect to safety and effectiveness, and more specifically, to report adverse medical device use consequences, such as malfunctioning
likely to cause serious irUury or death); 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.4, 801.15 (addressing labeling requirements such as stating the manufacturer's intended device use, labeling insufficiency such as inadequate information or space,
and formatting limitations on print size, style, clarity and background
contrast).
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a), (g); see also id. § 351 (g) (determining that a device
banned from the market is deemed to be considered adulterated).
51. See id. § 360c(a) (1) (A) (i). Even if it is not possible to determine that the
general controls are adequate to provide reasonable safety assurances, the
device would still escape further scrutiny if it did not present an unreasonable risk of illness or injury and (1) was not intended to be used to support
or sustain life, or (2) did not serve a substantial function in preventing
impairment. See id. § 360c(a) (l)(A)(ii)(I).
52. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 820.30 (subjecting items such as surgeon's gloves and
patient protective restraints to quality system design controls).
53. 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1, .22, .25, .30, .70. In addition, manufacturers of surgically implanted devices likely to result in significant injury, should the device fail to perform as intended, are required to batch and distribute the
device using a control system to facilitate corrective action. Id. § 820.65.
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ably ensure device safety and effectiveness. 54 Special controls include
requirements such as the establishment of patient registries, post-market surveillance, and designated performance standards. 55 Designated performance standards include specifications for device
construction, device testing to ensure adherence to established standards, specific labeling content and restrictions on device sale and
distribution. 56

c.

Class III Designation-Premarket Approval Process

When neither the general nor the specific controls provide reasonable safety assurances of a device that either: (1) is intended to support
or sustain life or is of substantial importance to prevent impairment;
or (2) presents an unreasonable risk of illness, then a Class III designation is required. 57 As a result of the inherent dangers, these devices
are subjected to a premarket approval (PMA) process. 58 Under the
PMA process, the device manufacturer must submit an application to
the FDA. 59 This application must contain full reports of investigations
regarding device safety and effectiveness, a discussion of the device
properties and mode of operation, a description of manufacturing
and packaging methods, proposed labeling, and if required, device
samples. 60 In addition, regulations require the application to include
clinical indications for device use, a description regarding how the
device functions, a listing of available alternative treatment interventions, and a description of the marketing history here and abroad,
including any market withdrawals. 61 Due to the level of scrutiny and
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (l)(B)-(C) (addressing Class II and Class III
devices).
55. See id. §§ 360c(a) (1) (B), § 360d (providing examples of performance standards and discussing how standards are established and recognized); see,
e.g., 21 C.F.R. § SSS.3070(a) (2) (i)-(iv) (listing the "special controls" for a
Class III pedicle screw spinal system, which include biocompatibility and
mechanical testing standards, specific warning labeling and a precaution
for use by specifically trained and experienced surgeons).
56. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a) (l)(B), § 360d.
57. [d. § 360c(a)(1) (C).
5S. [d. § 360c(a)(1) (C) (ii)(II) (requiring adherence to the PMA process to
reasonably ensure device safety and effectiveness).
59. [d. § 360e(c); see also 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b)(3)(v).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c); see also 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b)(3) (v) (delineating the
application to include information on clinical investigations involving
human subjects, as well as other nonclinicallaboratory studies). Reports of
clinical experimental studies must include information regarding human
subject selection, study length, and results of statistical analysis, including
adverse reactions and patient complaints. 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b) (6) (ii).
Nonclinical study reports contain information regarding biocompatibility,
response to use and stress, and device shelf life. [d. § S14.20(b)(6)(i).
61. [d. § S14.20(b) (3) (i)-(iv).
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attention to detail, the FDA spends an average of 1200 hours reviewing and approving a premarket device submission. 62

3.

Alternatives to Place Class III Medical Devices on the Market

Although the PMA process provides a safety net to protect the public from unsafe medical devices entering the market, this statutory
weapon has limited range due to the ability to place a Class III device
into the stream of commerce by alternative methods. A minority of
the Class III devices marketed today have undergone the rigorous
PMA standards. 63
In adopting the Medical Device Amendments, Congress realized
that devices falling into the Class III category, already in the stream of
commerce, needed to remain on the market while the FDA completed the PMA analysis for those devices. 64 Market forces 65 further
required that "substantially equivalent" devices to those already in the
marketplace needed an easier entry than the cumbersome and
lengthy PMA process. 66 In addition, to promote technological innovations, the MDA's scheme integrated an "[e]xemption for devices for
investigational use" specifically applicable to experimental devices. 67
"Substantially equivalent" Class III devices do not enter the market
in a completely unfettered fashion. Like new Class I and Class II devices, these Class III devices are subjected to a premarket notification
submission,68 also referred to as the "S10(k) process."69 The S10(k)
submission for a Class III device must include the device name, pro62. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (citing the hearings
before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce during the 1987 session); see also 21
U.S.C. § 360e(d) (1) (A) (providing the FDA with up to 180 days to decide
to approve or deny the application).
63. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (relying upon House Reports estimating that 91 %
of Class III devices introduced between 1976-83 and 80% of devices introduced in 1990 entered the market as "substantially equivalent" therefore
bypassing the premarket approval process).
64. See id. at 477-78 (explaining the rationale for the "grandfathering" provision for pre-1976 devices, but further adding in footnote 3 that the FDA
had not yet initiated the process for most Class III devices).
65. Congress identified the two market influences behind the "substantially
equivalent" exception as: (1) fear of market monopolization by manufacturers of pre-1976 devices, and (2) the desire to encourage the rapid entry
of improved existing devices. Id. at 478.
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1) (A) (defining "substantial equivalent" as a device
that has the same intended use, and either (i) the same technological characteristics as an already marketed device; or (ii) different technological
characteristics but information that demonstrates that the proposed device
is as safe and effective as the legally marketed device); see also Lohr, 518 U.S.
at 478 (referring to Congress' intention to permit these specific devices to
avoid the PMA process).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(I).
68. See id. § 360(k) (requiring the submission of a report to the FDA at least
ninety days before the device's market introduction).
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posed labeling showing intended use, a statement with supporting
data, indicating device similarities and differences from comparable
devices already in commercial distribution, and a financial disclosure. 70 If the intended use differs from that of the legally marketed
equivalent device, the FDA requires an explanation of why the differences do not affect device safety and effectiveness. 71 Overall, the review required by the 510(k) process takes on average twenty hours to
complete. 72 Only if the FDA required the underlying pre-1976 device
to submit to the rigors of the 510(k) process will the substantially
equivalent device receive such scrutiny. 73
The "investigational device exemption" (IDE) allows limited market
entry of new devices excluded from the rigorous PMA process. 74 Public health and safety concerns remain, but to encourage discovery and
development of efficacious devices, Congress implemented this ex-

69. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478 (defining the "premarket notification" as the "[section] 510(k) process" because that was the section number in the original
Act).
70. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (requiring the comparative device summary to include problems related to safety and effectiveness based upon a reasonable
search of information known or available).
71. See id. § 807.92(a) (5).
72. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (relying upon legislative reports of hearings before
the House in 1987). The Court in Lohr quotes a journal commentator who
stated that the "[section] 510(k) notification requires little information,
rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA, and gets processed very
quickly." Id. (citation omitted); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.100 (requiring the
FDA to merely determine if the device is or is not substantially equivalent to
a legally marketed device). But see supra note 62 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the average 1200 hours the FDA requires to complete
the PMA process.
73. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478; see also 64 Fed. Reg. 45,155 (Aug. 19, 1999). For
example, final regulations published on August 19, 1999, require inflatable
silicone breast implants to undergo the more vigorous PMA process. See 64
Fed. Reg. 45,155. It is interesting to note that although the FDA identified
this medical device "as one of the high-priority devices that would be subject to [the] PMA [process]" on January 6, 1989, proposed regulations were
not issued until January 8, 1993, and final regulations were not promulgated until August 19, 1999. See id.
74. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)(2) (1994); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 3,732-33. In 1980
when the FDA published the final regulations governing the IDE exemption, they responded to comments from the industry concerning the "burdens" placed on manufacturers and investigators by the IDE regulations.
See id. The FDA justified the regulations as "critical to [the] protection of
[human] subjects in all investigations" by requiring, among other standards, "informed consent, institutional review, and reporting of unanticipated adverse device effects." Id.; see also, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing
Sys., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that "[a]lthough investigational devices are not subject to the rigorous PMA process, they are
subject to a different set of complex and comprehensive regulations which
set forth detailed procedures for determining whether investigational devices are safe and effective").
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emption to provide optimal freedom to scientific investigators. 75 An
IDE device is exempted from certain FDCA standards including requirements regarding misbranding, premarket notification, performance standards, and many of the GMPs. 76
Device entry does not, however, occur without any scrutiny. The
initial IDE application must include, among other things, a description of the manufacturing methods and controls, and copies of all
device labeling.77 The applicant requesting an IDE must establish,
maintain and submit reports of data obtained during the investigational study.78 This data enables the FDA to determine compliance
with investigational standards, review progress of clinical trials and
evaluate device safety and effectiveness. 79 Throughout the investigational period, the investigators must personally supervise human studies and an informed consent from each subject must be obtained,
except in certain life-threatening or life-saving situations. 8o IDE device approval is denied if the human risk outweighs the anticipated
benefits to both specific individuals and the public as a whole. 81
III.

A.

STATE OR LOCAL STATUTORY PROTECTION FROM MEDICAL DEVICE FAILURE-FACT OR FICTION
Preemption Language oj the MDA

By enacting section 360(k), Congress preempted any requirements
established by state and local law that related to a medical device's
safety and effectiveness, or to any matter included within applicable
federal requirements that differ from or are in addition to requirements under the MDA.82 Federal regulations sought to narrow this
broad preemptive cloak by restricting preemption of state and local
75. 21 C.F.R. § B12.1(a) (allowing optimum freedom so long as it is consistent
with public safety and ethical standards within the medical profession).
76. [d.
77. [d. § B12.20; see also id. § B12.5. Specific labeling regulations require not
only a precautionary statement that the device is for "investigational use,"
but the label must indicate hazards and adverse effects and may not bear
"false or misleading" statements or indicate that the device is "safe and effective." See id.
7B. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
79. [d.
BO. [d. § 360j(g)(3)(C)-(D).
B1. 21 C.F.R. S B12.30(b) (noting additional reasons for disapproval include
fraudulent reporting, unsound scientific methodology, inadequate informed consent, or presumed lack of device efficacy).
B2. Section 360k states:
State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
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requirements only in situations where the FDA "has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable
to a particular device."83
The regulations define "state or local requirements" as those having
legal effect regardless of whether established through the legislative,
administrative or judicial process. 84 State or local requirements that
are not "applicable to a device" are not preempted merely because
they might affect a medical device. 85 In addition, requirements equal
to or substantially identical to federal requirements are not preempted. 86 Congress also empowered the Secretary, who then delegated the ability to the FDA, to exempt more stringent state and local
requirements or those necessitated by local conditions if they did not
violate federal requirements. 87 The federal requirements control ar-

S3.

S4.

S5.

S6.

S7.

(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable
to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
21 C.F.R. § SOS.I(d) (emphasis added). Language quoted from § SOS.I(d)
which states in part:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations
or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device
under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local
requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements.
[d. (emphasis added).
Relying on § SOS.1 (b) which states in part:
[As] a general rule [ ] after May 2S, 1976, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any requirement with respect to a medical device intended for human use
having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute,
ordinance, regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or
in addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under
any provision of the act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under the act.
[d. § SOS.1 (b) (emphasis added). But see infra notes S6-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "requirement" utilized in MDA as including specific statutory enactments and accompanying regulations, but
not judicially applied common law.
21 C.F.R. § SOS.l(d)(l), (3), (6)(ii) (including a laundry listing of examples ranging from requirements of general applicability such as electrical
codes, to licensing requirements such as those of the medical board regulating the surgeon who dispenses the device, to requirements prohibiting
the manufacture of adulterated devices).
[d. § SOS.l (d)(2). The FDA has responsibility for determining whether a
state or local requirement is equal to, different from, or in addition to a
federal requirement. See id. § SOS.l (e) (acknowledging the FDA decision is
subject to judicial review); see also id. § S08.1 (d) (qualifying the controlling
nature of the federal regulations in case of a conflict).
Section 360k(b) states:
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this sec-
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eas not covered by an exempted state or local requirement that are
narrower in scope than the corresponding federal requirements. 88
B.

Historic Preemption Analysis as Applied in Medical Device Litigation

1.

Preemption Principles

Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws are superseded, or, preempted, to the extent that they conflict with federal legislation. 89
Caution must be taken, however, in a preemption analysis because
finding a "clear and manifest" congressional intent is necessary before
superseding the "historic police powers of the States."90 Requiring
this standard has a long history beginning with the 1912 Supreme
Court case of Savage v. Jones. 91 In Savage, the Court distinguished between express and implied preemption, finding either sufficient if the
legislative intent was clearly manifest. 92
In 1947, the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator,93 addressed
the preemption scope where Congress provided express preemption
language in the federal.statute. 94 Despite the explicit statutory language, the Rice Court did not focus on the express language as the
assessment of congressional intent. 95 The Court reasoned that even
without the express language, congressional intent could be inferred,
especially when the federal interest dominated state interest or the
federal legislation was so comprehensive that it precluded the states'
ability to supplement the legislation. 96

88.
89.
90.
9l.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

tion, under such conditions as may be prescribed in such
regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if (1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement
under this chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement (A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause
the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(b).
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(f).
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citations
omitted).
[d. (citation omitted).
225 U.S. 501 (1912).
See Susan Raeker:Jordan, The Pre-emption that Never Was: Pre-Emption Doctrine
Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 13"'79, 1384-85 (1998) (tracing in Part II.B.
the historical judicial preemption analysis).
331 U.S. 218 (1947).
[d. at 222-23.
See id. at 230.
[d. (noting additionally that state exemption is appropriate when state policy is inconsistent with federal statutory objectives).
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In 1977, the Supreme Court addressed federal law preemption ofa
state regulation in Jones v. Rath Packing. 97 This case addressed certain
net-weight labeling requirements, an area "traditionally occupied by
the States.,,98 The Rath Packing Court clarified once again that the
preemption analysis "requires us to consider the relationship between
state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely
as they are written."99
A significant change in the historic preemption analysis occurred
with the 1992 Supreme Court decision of Cippollone v. Liggett. lOo In
Cippollone, the Court determined the scope of two statutory preemption provisions, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965 ("1965 Act") and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 ("1969 Act") .101 In its preemption analysis, the Court found that
when Congress, by express language, includes a preemptive provision,
and the written words reliably indicate congressional intent, no further inquiry of intent is necessary. 102
The 1965 Act expressly prevented "statements" related to "smoking
and health" that differed from the labeling requirements of the federal statute. 103 A majority of the Cippollone Court concluded that
"statement" referred to "only positive enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels."104 The
1969 Act amended the preemptive language of the 1965 Act by preempting not only "statements" but also "requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law."105 In concluding that the new

97. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
98. Id. at 525.
99. Id. at 526 (reaffirming a finding of preemption as "explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose").
100. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
101. See id. at 517.
102. See Raeker:Jordan, supra note 92, at 1407.
103. Under the 1965 Act, a section captioned "Preemption" stated in part:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on
any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required
in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added) ..
104. Id. at 518-19. Justices Scalia and Thomas did not concur with the 1965 Act
preemption analysis. See id. at 507.
105. Id. at 515. The 1969 Act modified subsection (b) of the 1965 Act's preemption provision to state: "[nlo requirement orprohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." Id. (emphasis added).
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language preempted some common-law actions, the Court no longer
reached a majority opinion. 106
A plurality of the Court decided that federal labeling requirements
preempted state common-law claims based upon state failure-to-warn
negligence actions that created legal duties or "requirements" with respect to cigarette promotion. I07 The plurality acknowledged that
even this expanded preemptive scope did not extend to express warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation claims. !Os
Although stating that the new principle was to look only to express
preemption language when provided, the Justices did not confine
their discussion to the words of the statute alone. In the opinion, the
Court placed emphasis upon the legislative purpose behind the 1969
Act, a purpose inferred based on substantive changes regarding labeling and advertising. 109 Despite this finding of an expanded legislative
purpose, the Court acknowledged that: (1) Congress did not amend
the express statutory purposes contained within the Act; and (2) the
express purposes suggested congressional concern with "positive enactments, rather than common-law damages actions."llo
2.

Application in Medical Device Litigation

One year after the Cipollone holding, the Eastern Division of the District Court of Virginia, in Flynn v. Biornet, Inc., III faced a complaint
alleging strict liability, negligent design and manufacture, and
breaches of express and implied warranties. 1l2 The device at issue was
a hip prosthesis, a Class III medical device, which entered the market
through the extensive PMA processYs Based upon the analysis in Cipollone, the court acknowledged that the "express preemption provision in the MDA preclud[ed] any reliance upon the doctrine of
implied preemption."I14 Because of the extensive federal standards
106. [d. at 521-23. Only four Justices, Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, White and
O'Connor, could agree on the preemptive analysis of the 1969 Act. See id.
at 507.
107. [d. at 524.
108. [d. at 531. Express warranty claims do not create "requirements" as they are
not state-imposed but rather "contractual commitment[s] voluntarily undertaken." [d. at 526. Fraudulent claims do not relate to "smoking and
health" but rather to "the duty not to deceive." [d. at 528-29.
109. [d. at 520 (reasoning that these changes broadened the preemptive scope
of section 5(b».
110. [d. at 521 n.19. Section 2, created by the 1965 Act and unchanged by the
1969 Act, lists two statutory purposes: "(1) adequately informing the public
that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health, and (2) protecting the
national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and
confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations." [d. at 514 n.9 (emphasis added).
111. No. CIVA 93-192,1993 WL 540570 (E.D. Va. July 23,1993).
112. [d. at *3.
113. [d. at *5; see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
114. Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *5.
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regarding device design, manufacturing, and labeling under the PMA
process, the court found that any state warranty laws or common-law
tort actions based on negligence imposed "additional" or "different"
requirements,1l5 and therefore were preempted by the MDA's express
languagey6 Summary judgment was granted for all of the claims,1l7
although the court noted that express warranties extending beyond
required FDA labeling could survive preemption. I IS
Other courts addressed the issue of preemption for Class III medical devices entering the market under a PMA exception. Experimental devices were distinguished from those undergoing the PMA
process by the California Court of Appeals in Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, IncY9 The court found that IDE devices were not subjected
to the "usual [FDA] safety and efficacy requirements," but to their
own set of regulations "intended to encourage innovation" in device
development, and therefore balanced the potential health risks of a
product against its potential medical treatment benefits. 120 Following
the lead of Cipollone and others, the court was concerned about the
impact of tort liability actions placing additional "requirements" upon
device manufacturers, serving to hamper innovation and frustrate the
legislative purpose for creating this exception. 121 But even more importantly, the court noted that strict liability and negligence claims
are "predicated on the notion that a manufacturer has a duty to market a safe product," contrary to the IDE process recognizing the need
for clinical trials to determine if the device is safe. 122 Conversely, for
the same reason these claims failed under a preemption analysis, warranty claims survived because" [a] ny guarantees of fitness as to investigational devices would not be imposed by the FDA but rather could
only be provided directly to consumers by the manufacturer."123
Even Class III devices entering the market through the less rigorous
51O(k) "substantially equivalent" process were considered subject to
115. [d.
116. [d. at *5-*7. See supra note 82 for the preemption language within the
MDA.
117. Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10.
118. [d. at *7 (quoting King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir.
1993) ). The court announced in dicta that even the strict liability claim
would be preempted. [d. at *6. Virginia law, however, prohibited strict liability recovery, thus, the court could not rule on that claim. [d.
119. 29 Cal. App. 4th 779, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (1994).
120. [d. at 785, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855; see also supra Part II.B.
121. Evraets, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 786-87, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56.
122. [d. at 787, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
123. [d. at 789,34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (concluding that their reasoning is analogous to how the Cipollone Court handled the express preemption claim). In
addition, the Evraets' court found that a medical device manufacturer could
not "claim the shield of preemption" when it had knowingly misled the
FDA to obtain approval. [d. at 790-91, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. The court
also upheld claims based upon the manufacturer's failure to adhere to federal regulations. [d. at 794, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
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federal requirements capable of exerting preemptive effect. In Duvall
v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb CO./ 24 ("Duvall!'), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's claims for
breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty based on FDAmandated requirements, defective design and manufacturing and failure to warn were preempted. 125 The court determined that because
the 510(k) "notification process" required manufacturers to indicate,
upon application, proposed labeling, design and manufacturing
processes, and to continue adherence to those standards, the "notification process" imposed requirements on the particular medical device. 126 Therefore, self-created manufacturing standards, reported to
the FDA through the "notification process" created binding federal
requirements capable of preempting state requirements. 127
With few claims surviving preemption because of the extensive federal medical device regulatory scheme,128 some courts did not even
find the need to discuss how the device entered the market. In Martin
v. American Medical Systems, Inc.,129 the plaintiff alleged strict liability,
negligence and breach of warranty claims. 130 The court granted summary judgment to the defendant based upon precedent,131 without
any discussion of the specific federal requirements applicable to this
particular medical device. 132
C.

Stirring the Waters: The Supreme Court's Preemption Analysis In Deciding Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

Simply identifying the express preemptive language in the statute
and accompanying regulations and relying upon previous Supreme
Court rationale is insufficient to resolve questions regarding MDA preemptive scope. Debate regarding this issue is easily found and reaches
beyond the language in the statutes and regulations. In 1996, the Supreme Court struggled to determine the prospective standard for a
preemption analysis of state claims related to federally controlled
124. 65 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, vacated, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996),
and remanded, 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter "Duvall!'].
125. Id. at 401. Once again, the court did not find preemption of express warranties regarding device performance made voluntarily by the manufacturer instead of by state law. Id. (relying on the Cipollone reasoning).
126. Id. at 399-400.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396,397 (D. Md. 1994) affd
in part rev'd in part, 82 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing cases both prior and
subsequent to Cipollone finding MDA preemption of "state-law based causes
of action").
129. 923 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va. 1996).
130. Id. at 90.
131. Id. at 91 (citing Duvall I for the holding that the MDA preempts state law
when state law imposes requirements on a medical device that are different
or additional to those imposed under the MDA).
132. See id.
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medical devices. Although reaching majority and even unanimous
conclusions, the Court was unable to agree beyond a plurality opinion
on the rationale to guide a preemption analysis.
1. . The Beginning of the Debate: Background Facts
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,133 the Supreme Court granted certiorq,ri to
determine which, if any, of the cross-petitioner's claims against the
manufacturer were preempted by the MDA provisions. 134 The initial
complaint filed by the Lohrs in 1993 alleged common-law negligence
claims for defective design and manufacture and failure to warn, and
strict liability claims for unreasonably dangerous design and defective
manufacture. 135
Lora Lohr required the surgical implantation of a cardiac pacemaker in 1987 to ensure proper heart functioning. 136 The device selected for implantation was a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with a
Model 4011 lead. 137 Ms. Lohr required emergency surgery on December 30, 1990 due to pacemaker failure allegedly causing a "complete
heart block."138 Her doctor presumed the lead caused the device
failure. 139
The initiation into the market of the Model 4011 pacemaker's lead
began in October 1982, when Medtronic notified the FDA that they
were seeking an exemption to the pre market approval process under
the "substantially equivalent" 510(k) process. 140 Medtronic was
granted approval to market the device on November 30, 1982, following the FDA concurrence that the device was substantially equivalent
to a pre-1976 device. 141 In their letter to Medtronic, however, the
FDA emphasized that FDA approval to market should not be considered a safety endorsement of Medtronic's product. 142
133. S18 U.S. 470 (1996).
134. Id. at 484 & n.6 Uustifying their decision by citing a string of cases demonstrating the discrepancy of holdings by various circuits).
13S. Id. at 481 (noting breach of warranty theory alleged in the complaint was
dismissed for failure to state a claim); see also Kramer v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., S20 So. 2d 37,39 (Fla. 1988) (noting the abolishment of a commonlaw implied warranty claim for personal injury with the adoption of the
strict liability doctrine).
136. Lohr, S18 U.S. at 480.
137. Id. (discussing the lead function to transmit an electronic signal from the
pacemaker generator to the heart, thereby controlling the heartbeat).
138. Id. at 481.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 480.
141. Id.
142. The FDA also noted that the Medtronic device would be subjected only to
the general controls for Class III devices marketed under the "substantially
equivalent" exemption. Id. For a discussion of the controls applicable to
all medical devices and specific information related to the section SI0(k)
process for "substantially equivalent" devices, see supra Part II.B.
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Faced with express preemptive language, the Court had to determine the intended legislative MDA preemptive scope: defective design
claims.143 Despite the differing opinions regarding preemption analysis principles, the Lohr Court reached unanimous agreement on two
of the Lohrs' claims. 144
.
The Lohrs presented a persuasive argument that manufacturers of
devices entering the market under the 510(k) process were not subjected to federally imposed design requirements. 145 Without federal
standards there could be no preemption of the state defective design
claims. 146
In addition, negligent manufacturing and labeling claims, insofar as
they allege a statutory violation or a regulatory requirement violation,
are not preempted. 147 The Court acknowledged that a state cause of
action seeking to enforce federal standards, whether imposed by the
MDA or the underlying FDA regulations, does not impose a requirement "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements. 148
3.

The Majority Opines

Recognizing that the preemption analysis began with the express
statutory language, the Court majority quickly identified the need to
review the language within the context of two underlying presumptions regarding preemption. 149 First, when Congress legislated in domains traditionally occupied by the several states, there was an
assumption that state power usurpation did not occur unless there was
143. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484 (identifying that their task was similar to the that of
the Court in Cipollone).
144. Id. at 513.
145. fd. at 492-93 (agreeing that the section 510(k) process requirements are
"not sufficiently concrete to constitute a pre-empting" and noting that the
design of the Model 4011 pacemaker lead was never analyzed from a safety
or efficacious perspective). The majority further reasoned that because
Congress intended the section 510(k) process to "maintain the status quo"
and equalize competition for marketing equivalent devices, manufacturers
of post-1976 equivalent devices would be subject to the status quo of defending against common-law claims for defective design. Id. at 494 & n.14.
The dissent took an even stronger position that the section 51O(k) process
"places no 'requirements' on a device." Id. at 513; see also supra note 50 for
a discussion of the focus of the 510 (k) process on equivalence-providing a
comparative analysis.
146. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494, 513 (declaring the majority and dissenting
opinions).
147. fa. at 497, 513 (declaring the majority and dissenting opinions). Throughout this Comment, references to "labeling" or "failure-to-warn" claims are
utilized interchangeably to reflect the differing language used in case
opinions.
148. !d. at 495-97, 513 (stating the majority and dissenting reasoning).
149. fd. at 484-85 (citing Cade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
111 (1992».
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a "clear and manifest" congressional intent. 150 Second, to determine
congressional intent, the Court looked not only at the preemption
provision and "the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,"
but also performed a reasoned analysis of how Congress intended the
federal act to impact upon business, consumers and the law. 151 The
Lohr Court m~ority agreed that state common-law negligent manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims were not preempted. 152 Under the
federal regulations, medical device manufacturers needed to adhere
to good manufacturing practices and comply with labeling
requirements. 153
The Lohrs argued that the general nature of these requirements
carry no preemptive effect over duties imposed by state common law
for the manufacture l54 ofa specific device because section 360k(a) (1)
expressly referenced a requirement "applicable to the device" not to
devices in general. 155 They also relied upon the statutory language of
section 360k(a) (2), preempting only those requirements relating to
the device safety and effectiveness or a matter included in a devicespecific requirement. 156
The majority conceded that federal requirements must apply to a
specific device to preempt counterpart state requirements and that
general state requirements would only be preempted where they place
150. Id. at 485 (discussing several Supreme Court cases supporting this proposition, but noting dissenting opinions that hold that the presumption should
only apply when deciding if preemption is intended at all, not when analyzing preemptive scope).
151. Id. at 485-86 (citing several cases supporting this presumption). But see discussion supra Part III.B.2. The Lohr Court, like many before, utilized the
often quoted Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947), opinion requiring a "clear and manifest" Congressional purpose to supersede the historic
state police powers. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. Mter tracing a thorough history
of preemption analysis, including implied preemption considerations, Susan Raeker:Jordan questions the Lohr stretch to look at the impact on businesses and consumers reasoning that going to such lengths raises questions
as to how "clear and manifest" is Congressional intent. See Raeker:Jordan,
supra note 92, at 1419.
152. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502.
153. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
154. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501 (noting that the manufacturer's general duties are to
use due care, to avoid foreseeable danger, and to inform users of risks involved in the use of potentially dangerous items). But see Duvall 1,65 F.3d
at 399 (finding the GMPs involving manufacturing facility standards, quality
assurance program, mandatory device failure reporting and federal labeling regulations create requirements giving rise to federal preemptive effect). In addition, the Duvall I court held that the 510(k) notification
process, which requires manufacturers to include proposed labeling and
maintain the device design and manufacture as represented, has preemptive effect. See id. at 399-400.
155. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
156. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360k.

408

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

a substantive requirement on a particular device. 157 Thus, the state
common-law manufacturing and warning duties escaped preemption
because their generality placed such requirements outside the scope
envisioned by the government. 158
4.

Plurality Rationale for Limiting the Scope

From this point forward the Justices became very fractured in their
preemption analysis. 159 Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsberg ("Four Justices") focused attention on the congressional intent
behind the selection and use of the word "requirement."160
These Justices addressed the Cipollone opinion as that case determined, in part, the meaning behind the word "requirement" used in a
preemptive statutory context. 161 Broad interpretation of "requirement" to include judicial decisions by the Court in Cipollone 62 was
considered distinguishable, as the narrowly focused preemptive statute had minimal impact upon state sovereignty.163 The Lohr case was
157. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500. Utilizing statutory construction, the dissent might
have found preemption of all the Lohr's common-law negligent manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims. The dissent views the GMPs and labeling
regulations as quite extensive and certainly specific enough to meet the
preemptive terms of section 360k(a). Id. at 513-14.
158. See id. at 501-02 (noting general common-law duties are not the type of
"requirements" Congress or the FDA feared would impact the enforcement
of specific federal standards). Additional understanding of this conclusion
may be gleaned from the Court's discussion in Part IV of the opinion, when
Medtronic advanced the argument that all common-law causes of action
create a "requirement" that imposes duties "different from, or in addition
to" the federal standards. Id. at 486. Four Justices responded that Medtronic's statutory construction could result in complete immunity to manufacturers for defective devices. In addition to closing the state door by
barring common-law claims, the MDA provides no express and probably no
implied private right of action to persons injured by defective devices
thereby closing the federal door. Aside from a general doubt that Congress
intended to protect an industry that it determined required more stringent
regulation, these four Justices found no support for Medtronic's argument
in the statutes, plain language, or accompanying legislative history. Id. at
487.
159. See id. at 503-05.
160. Id. at 486 (referring to the preemption language in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
(1994) that says, "no State ... may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement"). For complete
statutory language, see supra note 82.
161. See id. at 488 & n.8.
162. Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992) (discussing the "requirement" definition of the case and how such a definition "sweeps broadly"
and encompasses statutory enactments, regulatory interpretations, and judicial decisions).
163. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 488; see also Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 919 P.2d 410,
414 (1996) (contrasting the broad MDA statute to the narrowly focused
cigarette labeling statutes construed in Cipollone). For a discussion of preLohr cases extending "requirement" as used in the MDA to encompass common-law claim, see supra note 111-32 and accompanying text. The Lohr
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further distinguished because "requirements" was utilized throughout
section 360k of the MDA in a context suggesting targeting at specific
positive law enactments versus judicially applied common law. 164 Furthermore, the Four Justices reasoned that if such a broad preemptive
scope was envisioned, the legislators would have chosen more precise
language. 165
Court did not attempt to rewrite history but merely employed a stare decisis
analysis to follow other announced preemption principles. See, e.g.,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). In discussing congressional intent to preclude state common-law remedies, the Silkwood Court
found it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."
Id. at 251; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (citing Silkwood and noting that even the Silkwood dissent agreed with this concept). Other courts have interpreted Silkwood to require "a presumption
against preemption if it would deny an injured party all judicial remedies,
especially in the face of congressional silence." Montoya, 919 P.2d at 412
(deciding the MDA preemptive scope between the time the Lohr case was
argued and the Court announced the result). But see Flynn v. Biomet, Inc.,
No. CIVA 93-192,1993 WL 540570, at *10 (E.D. Va. July 23,1993) (finding congressional "failure to provide a federal remedy will not defeat [Congresses' J intent to preempt state law"). Furthermore, the Court m~ority
determined that even if the MDA statutory language was found to be ambiguous, deference to the FDA interpretation would be appropriate, yielding the same result. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. De! Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984».
164. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489-90 & n.ll (emphasizing section 360k(a)(2) preempting state statutory enactments and regulations "pursuant to the MDA"
and section 360k(b) and the corresponding regulations at 21 C.F.R.
§§ 808.53-808.101 providing the exceptions to preemption, none of which
include common-law claims). See also 21 U.S.C. § 360.
165. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487. It is worth noting the differing opinions among the
Justices regarding the frequency, or lack thereof, of common-law duty preemption by the MDA as well as the differing analyses of the remaining Justices. The Four Justices considered it rare that a common-law duty would
be preempted, as the Court's judgment would most likely not result in the
imposition of a device-specific substantive requirement. Id. at 502-03. Justice Breyer provided a slightly different analysis concluding that preemption of common-law claims may not be so rare as stated by the plurality. Id.
at 508. He cautioned that a court must not be granted greater power than
state officials to establish state requirements "different from, or in addition
to" federal requirements. Id. Justice Breyer highlighted the similarity between state regulatory standards and standards of care established in state
tort actions and notes that a similar analysis should be utilized to determine
preemptive effect. Id. He provided, hypothetically, a federal standard requiring the use of a two-inch hearing aid wire and argued that such a federal requirement should preempt not only a state regulation setting a oneinch standard but also prevent a court from finding liability based upon
expert testimony that use of greater than a one-inch wire would be negligent. Id. at 504. The dissent, focusing on the express statutory preemption
language, found the language to be unambiguous and admonished the
Court's, including Justice Breyer's, deference to the narrowly focused
agency interpretation. See id. at 512. Determining that state common-law
actions operate to require compliance with common-law duties and therefore impose "requirements," the dissent concluded that preemption should
occur where the requirements differed from federal standards. Id. at 509.
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Turning to the legislative history, Medtronic cited language in a
House report to argue that MDA preemption extends to common-law
claims because a corollary purpose of enactment was to prevent stifling of technological innovations through "unnecessary restriction."166 The Four Justices rejected this argument. Recognizing that
legislators were "acutely aware" of ongoing products liability litigation,
these Justices relied upon the absence of any decision in the legislative
history expressing concern that "product liability actions would hamper" technology and language acknowledging that "at least some
common-law claims" survived MDA preemption to reach their
conclusion. 167
The majority agreed with the Lohrs' argument that even if "requirements" included state common-law claims, those "requirements" are
not preempted unless they are "different from, or in addition to" the
federal standards. 168 Although recognizing that a claim based upon a
state common-law violation may require proof of certain elements,
these additional "state requirements," though technically "different
from," merely made the state requirements narrower. 169 Their position was supported by FDA regulations that limit preemption to situations where there are "specific" counterpart regulations or "specific"

166.

167.

168.
169.

The dissent relied on the Cipollone majority conclusion that state commonlaw damages actions did impose "requirements," finding no distinction between enacted law andjudicialiy established duties. Id. at 510. The dissent
further rejected the plurality emphasis on device-specific requirements
pointing to the absence within the statute of any reference to specificity. Id.
at 511-12; see also 21 U.S.c. § 360k.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490 (explaining that H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 12, was cited
in petitioner's supporting brief). Although acknowledging that an objective was to encourage innovation, the Four Justices focused on what they
believed to be the key purpose of the MDA, which was "to provide for the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices." Id. (relying on the MDA express statutory language). Susan Raeker:Jordan raises the question regarding what conclusions the plurality would have made if they had focused on
Medtronic's argument that the MDA intended to protect technological innovations "from being stifled by unnecessary restrictions, and that this interest extended to the pre-emption of common-law claims." Raeker:Jordan,
supra note 92, at 142l.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490-91 (referring to records of the "hearings, the Committee Reports, [and] debates"). The Four Justices instead interpreted "restrictions" to indicate fear of additional regulatory burdens rather than
imposition of common-law duties upon manufacturers. Id. at 490. Additional support was gleaned from the lack of contemporary commentary
viewing the MDA as having a broad sweeping preemption of common-law
claims. Id. at 491 n.13.
Id. at 495 (referring to statutory language in section 360k(a) (1»; see also 21
U.S.c. § 360k.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 (distinguishing from state requirements that broaden
federal standards and thus refusing to extend the preemptive scope by providing a literal interpretation of "different from"). The Court further
noted that a damages remedy merely provides an impetus to comply with
overlapping state and federal law. Id.
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requirements for a particular device. 170 Because Congress empowered the FDA to promulgate regulations consistent with the MDA and
to interpret the scope of preemption under section 360k, congressional deference required substantial weight to be given to the
agency's interpretation. 171

D.

The Aftermath: Attempts to Explain and Apply the Lohr Analysis

Prior to Lohr, most courts analyzing the preemptive scope of section
360k(a) found broad preemption of state common-law claims. l72 The
Lohr Court upset this stability in an analysis that deviated from the
road map provided by Cipollone. 173 In addition, the Lohr dissent argued that the Court deviated from the Court's analysis in Chevron USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 174 The "fractured holding"175 in Lohr has left the legal community grappling to find clear
language to guide future preemption analysis. 176 As a result, courts
170. Id.; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
171. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying especially on delegated duties that require the
FDA to analyze the preemptive effect of the federal standards upon state
laws i.e. section 360k(b) providing statutory authority for the FDA to exempt state regulations from preemption and 21 C.F.R. § 808.5 allowing the
issuance of advisory opinions regarding preemption of a state requirement); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Lohr majority
acknowledged that it is both the congressional delegation of power to the
FDA and the ambiguity in the statute that supports deference to the
agency's interpretation. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying on the standard established in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Rres. De! Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) and Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CN.A. 93-192, 1993 WL 540570 (E.D.
Va. July 23,1993». The dissent argued that the statutory language is clear
and therefore "resort[ing] to the agency's interpretation is improper."
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
172. See Scott W. Sayler & Steven M. Thomas, Post-Decision Diagnosis: Medical Device Preemption Alive and Mostly Well After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 6 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 185, 186 (1997); see, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103
F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting the initial holding pre-Lohr that the
plaintiff's common-law claims for breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty based on FDA-mandated requirements, defective design and
manufacturing and failure to warn were preempted by the express statutory
language of section 360k(a» [hereinafter "Duvall If']; see also supra Part
III.B.
173. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. But see supra note 143 and accompanying text.
174. The dissent suggested that the majority denied deferring to the regulations,
but merely utilized the regulations to "inform" them on the meaning of the
preemptive statute. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
175. Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 185 (referring to the four separately
written opinions).
176. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing its obligation to adhere to Supreme Court holdings but adding
that the "holding in [Lohr] contains several ambiguities that impair our
ability to perceive with absolute clarity the path that the Court has chosen
for us to follow").
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apply different standards to determine preemption, citing Lohr for
support.

1.

A Simplistic Two-Prong Inquiry

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Oja v.
Howmedica, Inc. 177 interpreted the Lohr opinion to require a two-prong
inquiry to determine state-law preemption. 178 The first prong of the
inquiry focused on the federal requirement, allowing preemption
only if the federal requirement is device-specific. 179 The second
prong focused on the state requirement, allowing preemption only if
the state requirement is (1) device specific or a general standard that
establishes substantive requirements for a specific device, and (2)
"'different from, or in addition to' a federal requirement."180
Applying the two-prong inquiry to the facts, the Oja court determined that the FDA "requirement" restricting marketing for non-cemen ted use satisfied the first prong inquiry of a federal device-specific
requirement. 181 Despite finding a device-specific federal requirement, the court found that the state common law survived preemption because the elements of the second-prong inquiry were not
satisfied. 182
177. III F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997).
178. Id. at 788. On appeal, the court addressed three claims-negligence, negligent failure to warn and strict liability-against Howmedica, Inc., the manufacturer of the Porous-Coated Anatomic One-Piece Acetabular
Component hip (PCA hip) surgically implanted into Maureen Oja on July
2, 1984. Id. at 784-85. Upon removal of the PCA hip on July 29, 1992,
necessitated by Oja's severe pain, the surgeon discovered that the PCA hip
staking peg was missing, the polyethylene liner had separated from the
metal cap, and debris from the disintegrating lining was scattered throughout Oja's hip joint. Id. at 785.
179. Id. at 788 (recognizing that the Lohr Court's analysis relied on both the
statutory language of section 360k and regulatory language of § 808.1 (d».
180. Id.
181. Id. at 789. The PCA hip entered the stream of commerce initially under
the 51O(k) process after Howmedica, Inc., submitted a premarket notification to the FDA on April 25, 1983. Id. at 78~7. The FDA granted final
approval on August 10, 1983, conditioned on marketing and promotion of
the PCA hip for use only in conjunction with low-viscosity cement. Id. at
787. The federal "requirement" was therefore not restricted to standards
established through legislative enactment or regulatory rule making but
was viewed by this court to encompass administrative policy decisions, including those provided in private letters to specific manufacturers. Id. at
789.
182. Id. (adopting the reasoning of the LohrCourt that the general duty to warn
purchasers of potentially dangerous items is not the type of state "requirement" that would interfere with the federal interest advanced by the MDA).
In addressing the defective manufacturing claim based upon a strict liability theory, the Oja court reversed the directed verdict for Howmedica, Inc.
Id. at 793. Although not required to apply the two-prong inquiry to reach
this decision, the holding indicates that the claim most likely survives preemption, otherwise there existed no reason for reversal.
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A Three-Condition Test

An unpublished Fifth Circuit opmlOn discussed in Lewis v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc. 183 provided a different test, based upon the
Lohr analysis, for determining when preemption exists. 184 Lewis required a finding of three conditions for state-law preemption to occur:
(1) a federal device-specific requirement, usually in the form of a regulation, (2) a state safety and effectiveness requirement or any other
federal requirement applicable to the device, with "requirement" referring to statutes, regulations, ordinances, or common-law duties,
and (3) "the state requirement is different from, or in addition to, the
federal requirement."185 In addition, this test is to be applied to any
medical device regardless of the mechanism utilized to enter the market. 186 Applying the test, the only claim to survive preemption was the
argument that Intermedics violated FDA regulations. 187 Finding that
a judgment regarding the state-law defective design claim could impose "requirements" different from the detailed regulations governing the design process for IDE devices, the court determined that
preemption was appropriate. I88
183. 19 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. La. 1998) [hereinafter "Lewis If'].
184. Id. at 626 (determining that any Fifth Circuit MDA preemption analysis
must not only occur within the context provided by Lohr but also as that
opinion was interpreted by Lewis v. Intennedics, No. 95-31080, slip op., 114
F.3d 1182 (5th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter "Lewis r]).
185. Id. at 628.
186. Id. at 628-29 (noting that Lewis I demands application of the test for devices
undergoing premarket approval or entering through the exceptions created by the 510(k) and IDE processes); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (Dec. 12,
1997) (proposing an interpretive rule to clarify the FDA's "longstanding"
position regarding preemption in light of the confusion created when the
Lohr Court did not "definitively decide" the preemptive scope for devices
entering the market via the PMA or IDE paths). These proposed FDA regulations may have influenced courts like Lewis I because, in the discussion
supporting the need for the regulation, the FDA explicitly stated that the
preemption analysis in Lohr is applicable to any device, regardless of how
the device entered the market. See Lewis II, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (noting
that state common-law claims generally are not preempted by the MDA).
But see supra note 150.
187. See Lewis II, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 629. In this case, five plaintiffs alleged defective design, failure to warn and breach of warranty for severe eye damage,
including blindness in one case, from surgically implanted intraocular
lenses manufactured by Intermedics. Id. at 626. The particular 44B lens is
a Class III medical device that entered the market through the IDE process.
Id. at 627. Lewis I interpreted Lohr to unequivocally find no preemptive
effect of claims based upon violations of FDA regulations, and the record
reflected that Intermedics failed to notify investigators that the "44B design
was under attack" and failed to warn of potential problems experienced
during the investigational study. Id. at 629-30.
188. Id. at 630 (reviewing the congressional purpose of the IDE process to encourage research and development, recognizing the need for experimentation because of the inherent lack of a known safe and effective designs as
well as other court holdings that common-law claims impose requirements
different from IDE regulations).
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A Complex Two-Prong Analysis

In addition to courts grabbling to create a clear and objective preemption analysis consistent with Lohr, various commentators have attempted the same task. In one publication worth noting, authors
Scott Sayler and Steven Thomas utilize key language to fashion yet
another test. 189 Their test, in essence, is a more detailed two-prong
analysis. Federal requirements will typically have a preemptive effect
provided that they: (1) are device specific, and (2) "constitute 'specific
counterpart regulations' to state law .... "190 State requirements will
typically be preempted if they: (1) are "developed 'with respect to
medical devices;'" (2) have specific applicability; (3) are "different
from or in addition to federal requirements;" and (4) are "concerned
with safety, efficacy, or any other matter included in a federal requirement that applies to the device."191 Although not in a situation to
apply the test, Sayler and Thomas believe that a careful analysis between the state and federal requirements in question would find the
preemption defense viable for devices entering the market through
either the PMA or IDE processes. 192 Defining the "regulation-intensive" "device-specific" PMA and IDE processes as "safety-oriented
mechanisms," state common-law claims would likely create "requirements" that conflict with the specific federal interests articulated
through regulatory standards. 193 The authors also caution that future
cases dealing with devices entering the market through the 510(k)
process need to include an analysis of any changes to the labeling and
GMP regulations made after the Lohr decision, as well as, any changes
to the 510(k) process, especially the adoption of regulations focusing
on safety.194
189. See Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 185.
190. Id. at 190.
191. Id. (noting the specific applicability requirement acts as a savings clause for
requirements of "general applicability").
192. Id. at 208; see also supra notes 60-62, 77-81 and accompanying text.
193. See Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 200. Although admitting that the
Lohr Court never directly announced that the holding was applicable only
to devices that enter the market through the 51O(k) process, the authors
find the LohrCourt's lengthy attention to the 510(k) process indicative of a
narrow holding. See id. at 195-96. Furthermore, they caution against extending the holding to factually dissimilar cases such as situations in which
devices entered the market through the PMA or IDE processes. Id. at 195.
But see id. at 204 & nn.89, 101,206 (acknowledging various cases, including
a Fourth Circuit case decided post-Lohr, in which the courts reached different conclusions regarding devices entering the market through the PMA
and IDE processes).
194. Id. at 201. Speculating that future federal requirements would most likely
not dictate product design, the authors surmise that defective design claims
would escape preemption. Id. at 208. They immediately noted, however,
the likelihood of other defenses available to manufacturers including the
proposed draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)"). Id. Compare Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721
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EXPLORING VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION: FACTORS TO
CONSIDER

The complexity of Class III medical device litigation is exacerbated
when plaintiffs allege multiple causes of action against manufacturers.195 At times, court opinions combine claims or utilize different
nomenclature to discuss specific claims, thus creating obstacles to understanding the court's reasoning for their conclusions. As a result, a
better understanding of preemption and medical device litigation can
be achieved by exploring each cause of action separately.196
Although emphasis is placed on preemption, the reader should not
lose sight of other hurdles facing the injured plaintiff. Proving causation is not an easy task for plaintiffs. 197 With delay in identifying the
cause as proximately related to the medical device, and the potential
for class action litigation, there also exists statute of limitation
problems. 198 Furthermore, because medical devices reach the ultimate consumer in a somewhat unusual manner, additional considerations need to be explored before initiation of an action against others
in the distribution chain. 199

195.

196.
197.

198.
199.

N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Ill. 1999) (holding that the PMA process does not impose device specific design requirements because the design "originate[s]
solely with the manufacturer of the device, not the FDA"), with Salazar v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. CIVA C-96-425 , 1997 WL 1704284, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 8, 1997) (deciding "any claim challenging the design" would be preempted because the PMA process contains specific federal device design
requirements). See discussion infra Part IV.D.
See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996) (alleging negligence
and strict liability); Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 156 (4th Cir.
1999) (alleging breach of express and implied warranties, fraud and negligence) [hereinafter "Talley If']; Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 326 (alleging breach
of express warranties, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose, strict liability for defective design, defective
manufacture, and failure to warn, and negligent design, manufacture, promotion, and sale); Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-192, 1993 WL
540570, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 23, 1993) (alleging breach of implied warranty
of merchantability, negligent design and manufacture, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express warranty, strict liability, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
See infra Part IV.A-D.
See generally Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no breach of implied warranty under which plaintiff
could recover damages for injuries sustained using disinfectant manufactured by the defendant); Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644,
647 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
defendant's failure to warn plaintiff's doctor of alleged risk of GuillainBarre Syndrome associated with its product was the cause-in-fact of her injury); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions: Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 401, 46682 (2000) (discussing various alternative tort causation doctrines and their
applicability to the medical malpractice claims).
See infra Part IV.F.
See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
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Common-Law Breach oj Duty and Negligence Per Se

Negligence claims relating to design, manufacture, and failure to
warn against the medical device manufacturer for devices that reach
the market through the 510(k) process are currently not preempted
based on the LohrCourt's analysis and its outcome. 200 Breach of duty
creates a cause of action that may constitute a "requirement" that is
preempted when there is a conflict between the state requirement
and a device-specific federal regulation or statutory requirement. 201
State common-law claims pertaining to 510(k) devices currently survive preemption because these devices are subjected only to "general"
federal manufacturing and labeling requirements. 202
Even though broad preemption of many negligence claims occurred prior to Lohr,203 there remained some remedies available to
the plaintiff. 204 A claim of negligent contamination of a medical device was likely to survive preemption. 205 In addition, negligent surgical implantation or removal claims fall outside the preemptive scope,
although these are medical malpractice and not products liability
claims. 206
To defend a negligence claim based upon unreasonably dangerous
design, the manufacturer must prove that prevailing safety standards
were met, not that the "safest conceivable design" was utilized. 207 Although issues of defective design are usually determined by a jury, if a
plaintiff fails to show a safety standard violation the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 208
Although uninsulated by the preemptive cloak of section 360k(a)
for negligent failure-to-warn claims, manufacturers receive some protection through the "learned intermediary" doctrine. 209 This doctrine
provides an exception to the manufacturer's general duty to warn
200. See Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 (finding "little difficulty" concluding, based
upon the Lohr reasoning, that the state-law claims advanced by Duvall regarding negligent design and manufacture and failure to warn were not
preempted by section 360k(a».
201. See id. (developing me rule to utilize from a summation of me Lohr
analysis).
202. See id. (referring to the GMPs and labeling requirements contained in 21
C.F.R. §§ 801,820 (1996».
203. See, e.g., Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 82 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1996); Duvall I,
65 F.3d at 401; Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-192, 1993 WL 540570,
at *6 (E.D. Va. July 23, 1993).
204. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
205. See Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10; see also infra note 239.
206. See Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10.
207. Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 725, 731 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd by,
179 F.3d 154 (4m Cir. 1999) (relying on Redman v. John D. Brush & Co.,
111 F.3d 1174 (4th Cir. 1997» [hereinafter "Talley /'].
208. Id.
209. See Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162 (relying on Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264,
1276 (5th Cir. 1974».
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consumers about risks associated with product use. 210 The doctrine's
scope may be limited to warning of potential risks and, therefore, may
not extend to situations where the manufacturer fails to inform the
consumer that a new and improved device has entered the market. 211
Under the doctrine, for products requiring surgical implantation by
the physician, the manufacturer owes a duty to warn the physician
only and not the ultimate consumer.212 The doctrine is based on
sound policy reasons identifying that the learned professional is in the
best position to provide an assessment of the benefits and risks to each
patient for the various medical products available to treat their condition. 213 Support is gathered from the practical reality that it is virtually impossible for manufacturers to provide adequate patient
warnings. 214
In order for the learned intermediary doctrine to be applied, the
physician must indeed be an intermediary, which is described as "an
intervening and independent party between patient and drug manufacturer."215 When there is an existing relationship between the physician and the manufacturer, whether the physician falls within the
category of intermediary is determined by exploring the nature of the
relationship.216 Particular emphasis is placed on the extent to which
210. Id.
211. In determining the validity of a strict liability claim, the Fourth Circuit
noted that strict liability focuses on a failure to disclose risks associated with
the particular device in question making discussion of alternative options
irrelevant. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1233 (4th Cir. 1984).
Although not deciding a negligence claim, the court articulated that a negligence claim based upon failure to inform of an alternative might be sustained. Id.
212. Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162. Hospitals also receive protection from the
"learned intermediary doctrine" because the hospital personnel do not select the device to be utilized and the manufacturer's warnings are directed
only to the physician using the device. See Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp.,
No. ClV. A. 92-3180-17,1993 WL 1156110, at *6 (D.S.C.Jan. 7,1993) (determining that the hospital was a "sham defendant" for purposes of
diversity) .
213. See Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162-64 (quoting Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657
F.2d 642, 644 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981».
214. See id. (citing Hill v. Searle Lahratories, Inc., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir.
1989) to note that (1) inclusion of written warnings within the product
packaging could not ensure receipt by the patient because the product is
applied by the physician, and (2) even if able to provide written warnings to
each product user, the warnings are often too technical for an informed
decision regarding product use).
215. Id. (quoting Hil~ 884 F.2d at 1070). Talley advanced the argument that as a
consultant to Danek, the financial connection rendered Dr. Mathews, her
surgeon, incapable of independence from Danek thus eliminating the doctrine as a defense. See id.
216. Id. at 163-64. The consultative services provided to Danek by Dr. Mathews
consisted of designing and facilitating FDA approval of endoscopes and
serving as an instructor for surgical techniques utilizing products manufactured by Danek and others. Id. at 157. Annual compensation included an
income of $250,000, certain paid research and travel expenses, and receipt
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the physician is allowed to make independent medical decisions regarding device use. 217 The learned intermediary doctrine may provide no protection if the physician is too closely related, such as being
an agent, to the manufacturer. 218
In Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc.,219 ("Talley IF') the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that committing
an FDA violation by marketing a device for off-label use does not constitute negligence per se. 220 The court first acknowledged the difference between statutory violations that amount to a breach of tort duty
supporting a negligence per se claim and statutory violations of administrative requirements that do not support such a claim. 221 Although
determining that some FDA violations create negligence per se
claims,222 obtaining FDA medical device approval is viewed as an administrative requirement setting no substantive standard, and therefore negating a negligence per se claim. 223 The Talley II court gathered

217.
218.
219.
220.

221.

222.

223.

of 25,000 shares of Danek company stock. Id. Dr. Mathews explained that
his decision to utilize the Dyna-Lok Device was based upon the individual
patient circumstances, further noting his preference for the device because
of its predictability, ease of application and of use in surgical teaching, and
cost effectiveness. Id. The record reflected Dr. Mathews' use of other spinal fixation devices or no device at all when performing spinal fusions. Id.
at 157, 164.
Talley II, 179 F.3d at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
179 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 161. Mter two prior failed back surgeries, Talley agreed to a third
operation consisting of a spinal fusion through the use of a Dyna-Lok Device, a medical device marketed by Danek Medical. Id. at 156. This particular device was recommended by Dr. Mathews, who intended to attach the
device to the spine pedicles to enhance Talley's potential for a successful
spinal fusion. Id. At the time of her surgery, although approved as a Class
II device, the Dyna-Lok was not FDA-approved for use as a spinal fixation
device. Id. at 160. Other pedicle screw fixation devices were Class III devices according to the FDA. Id. Talley argued that committing an FDA
violation by marketing a device for an unapproved use constitutes negligence per se under Virginia law. [d. at 156, 160. Finding the negligence per se
doctrine inapplicable is consistent with the principles established in the
newly published products liability Restatement, articulating that statutory or
regulatory noncompliance is a factor to be considered but not automatically decided as a matter of law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(b).
Talley II, 179 F.3d at 161. The court provides some conceptual illustration
of the difference by comparing a duty to abide by the standard of care
requirement, established through enactment of a speed-limit law with administrative requirements, such as obtaining a license or filing a report,
that do not create tort duties. [d. at 158-59.
Id. at 161 (citing the decision in Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d
455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) that a substantive care standard, similar to the
standard created by a speed-limit law, was created by the FDA requirement
to correctly label the size of a surgical nail).
[d. (noting that approval alone does not create a substantive requirement
but rather functions as "a tool to facilitate administration of the underlying
regulatory scheme"); see also Hartwell v. Danek Med., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d
703, 705 (W.D. Va. 1999) (citing comments in a final FDA rule, 63 Fed.
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additional support for its decision by concluding that FDA approval is
analogous to a licensing requirement to sell a medical device. 224 Further, the trend among Virginia courts is to resolve licensing infringements by demonstrating a lack of causation. 225
Because of the type of FDA violation alleged, the Talley II court
never directly opined about preemption of claims based upon FDA
violations. 226 Through one unpublished opinion and dicta in Duvall
II, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Lohr required a finding that
claims alleging violation of state-law duties that parallel FDA requirements are not preempted. 227
B.

Breach of Warranty

Breach of warranty claims fall within one of several categories:
breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty based upon
FDA-mandated labeling and promotion requirements, and breach of
express warranty based upon the manufacturer's voluntary representation of their product. 228 The breach of warranty claims could be
based upon statutory duties under language similar to Article II of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or obligations created under common law. 229 The Lohr Court's analysis is controlling, at least with respect to devices entering the market through the 510(k) process,
despite the fact that the Lohr Court did not have to address breach of
warranty claims. 230
The FDA requires certain statements be utilized in the promotion
of medical devices. 231 For a device entering the market through the
510 (k) process, manufacturers must submit proposed labeling and advertising information to the FDA. 232 If the device meets the "subs tan-

224.

225.
226.
227.

228.
229.
230.
231.

232.

Reg. 40026, 40036-37 Guly 27, 1995), acknowledging off-label use of pedicle fixation devices as an appropriate standard of care used by many
surgeons).
Talley II, 179 F.3d at 159-60. The Talley II court cautioned against trivializing an FDA violation because causation might be determined for infringement of a regulation controlling medical device quality or proper labeling.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 159-60.
See generally Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, SIS U.S. 470, 49S (1996).
Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 423124, at *1-*2
(4th Cir. July 30, 1996) (per curiam) (noting that even the Lohr dissent
agreed with this position); Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 n.4 (acknowledging
that is was not necessary to decide the issue because any claim based upon
an FDA violation was waived when not presented to the district court).
See infra text accompanying notes 231-46.
See infra text accompanying notes 231-46.
Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 & n.5.
21 C.F.R. § SOl (noting general labeling provisions); see also supra note 70
and accompanying text for a discussion of labeling requirements.
21 C.F.R. § S07.S7(e).
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tially equivalent" criteria, the green light to market creates FDAmandated labeling and promotion requirements. 233
In Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb CO.,234 the court quickly found that
express warranty claims based upon FDA-mandated statements required for "substantially equivalent" devices are not preempted because neither the 510(k) notification process nor the general labeling
requirements carry preemptive effect. 235 Although not having to rule
on the merits of the express warranty claim based on oral representations, the court affirmed the decision that such claims are not preempted. 236 Even prior to Lohr, under the broader preemptive cloak,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that an express warranty claim based
upon promises voluntarily offered by the manufacturer were not preempted under section section 360k(a).237 The contractual "requirements" of an express warranty are self-imposed by the manufacturer,
not "imposed under State law."238
Likewise, the Duvall II court determined that breach of implied warranty claims survive preemption, relying on the rationale in Lohr. 239
Similarly, the court in Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc.,24o based
their decision on Lohr's reasoning that the 510(k) process does not
eliminate common-law liability in part because nothing in the 510(k)
233. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 332. To create an FDA labeling requirement through
the issuance of a private letter to the manufacturer see supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
234. 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996).
235. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 332 (determining the Lohrdecision as explicitly dictating such a position although not having to rule on the merits, and thus
finding no error in the district court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of Bristol-Myers-Squibb). In 1990 Duvall had an inflatable penile
prosthesis manufactured by Bristol-Myers-Squibb implanted, however, malfunctioning of the prosthesis required subsequent surgical removal. Id. at
326. This particular prosthetic device entered the market through the section 510(k) process after successfully completing clinical trials under the
IDE exception for Class III devices. Id. at 328. Bristol-Myers-Squibb argued
that Lohrwas not controlling because this device was tested under the rigorous IDE regulations prior to requesting section 510(k) status. Id. at 330.
The court was unpersuaded because nothing in the MDA statutory scheme
indicated that IDE requirements remain in effect after the experimentation
exception expires. Id. Duvall II dealt with an express warranty claim, based
on information contained in a promotional brochure utilized by BristolMyers-Squibb, to advertise their product. Id. at 33l.
236. Id.
237. Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 82 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1996); Duvall!, 65 F.3d at
400-Ol.
238. Duvall I, 65 F.3d at 400 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504,525-26 (1992)).
239. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 329-30. Although the Lohr Court did not address a
claim for breach of implied warranty, the Court referenced an FDA regulation listing the UCC warranty of fitness as a type of state regulation that
survives section 360k(a) preemption. Id. at 330 n.5.
240. 116 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1997).
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process connotes an FDA endorsement regarding device safety and
efficacy. 241
In deciding Martin, the court addressed a breach of warranty claim
based upon a Virginia statute limiting, as a defense, lack of privity in
an action for breach of express or implied warranty.242 In Martin, the
manufacturer extended a limited warranty to the physician responsible for medical device surgical implantation. 243 The Fourth Circuit
determined that this express warranty claim survived preemption thus
allowing Martin to rely upon the Virginia statute to determine the
manufacturer's warranty scope and validity.244 The court also held
that the warranty formed the basis of the bargain even though the
plaintiff was unaware of the express limited warranty prior to the litigation. 245 Regulatory language demonstrates the FDA position that
241. Id. at 103-04 (vacating the district court's decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with the opinion that the breach of implied
warranty claim is not preempted by the MDA). After suffering from erectile dysfunction, John Martin agreed to surgical implantation on June 2,
1993, of the Dynaflex inflatable prosthesis manufactured by American Medical Systems. Id. at 103. The Dynaflex is a Class III device that entered the
market through the 510(k) process. Id. at 103-04. After sustaining an infection that did not respond to conventional treatment, Martin had the
prosthesis surgically removed. Id. Continued complications from the infection necessitated five hospitalizations for various surgical interventions leaving Martin with a shortened and disfigured penis. Id. at 103. Martin based
the implied warranty claim on the premise that the Dynaflex would be distributed in a sterile condition safe for implantation. Id. at 103-04.
242. Id. at 104-05. The Virginia statute at issue states:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense
in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods
to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or
for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods
from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume,
or be affected by the goods ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Michie 1950). See generally Richard E. Speidel,
The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Commercial
Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804, 813-41 (1965) (discussing privity through the interface of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") § 402A and
the Uniform Commercial Code in products liability suits). See also U.C.C.
§ 2-318 cmt. 2 (explaining that rule of privity does not preclude certain
beneficiaries from receiving the same benefit of warranty that the buyer
received in the contract of sale).
243. Martin, 116 F.3d at 103 n.l (referencing the warranty, "the AMS Dynaflex
Penile Prosthesis ... [is] delivered to the hospital prefilled and sterile").
244. Id. at 104. The court relied on Lohrto overturn the district court's holding.
See id. The district court determined that although the claim was not preempted per se because Martin was unaware of the AMS limited warranty, any
judgment in his favor would be based solely on Virginia state law thus failing under the preemption analysis. Id.
245. Id. at 105 (citing Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992) to support
factual findings that: (l) an awareness that the physician or hospital is not
the ultimate user prevents American Medical Systems from relying on their
limited warranty language, and (2) "Martin surely did· rely on and expect
the fact warranted to be true: Le. the implant was sterile").
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warranty claims based upon obligations articulated in the VCC are
untouchable by section 360k(a) preemptive scope. 246
The Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to extend liability to
a health-care provider based upon breach of warranty claims under
the VCC as it applies to transactions in goods and not to services. 247
Under a similar analysis, a hospital providing services, including the
use of a surgical suite and the purchasing of a medical device for the
surgeon, escaped liability under a VCC warranty claim. 248
C.

Fraud

Fraud claims take many forms and in a competitive market as the
temptation to commit fraud lurks at every corner. For example, manufacturers can make fraudulent misrepresentations during the FDA application and approval process including false statements and fraud
through active concealment. 249 Regardless of the FDA status of their
device, the potential exists to utilize fraudulent marketing and promotional techniques. For example, manufacturers could overstate the
performance or clinical uses of a device, or fail to inform users of risks
identified with device use. Although not specifically requested to analyze a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the Lohr Court opined that
fraud claims would most likely survive preemption. 250

246. The MDA "does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates to products other
than devices (e.g., requirements such as general electrical codes, and the
Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness», or to unfair trade practices." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d) (1).
247. See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 503 S.E.2d 445, 452 (S.C. 1998)
(supporting their holding with lower court and other jurisdictional decisions and statements in learned treatises). It is worth noting that this case
was heard under writ of certiorari finding the issues to be both novel legal
questions and issues of great public interest. Id. at 447 & n.2.
248. See Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp., No. ClV.A.92-3180-17, 1993 WL
1156110, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 1993) (determining that the hospital was
"sham defendant" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Here, the court
determined that the plaintiff could not recover against an in-state hospital
for strict liability and breach of implied warranties because the hospital was
not engaged in the sale of goods, therefore, the South Carolina Commercial Code was inapplicable. Id. at *4-*6. Because the court found the instate hospital a "sham defendant," removal of the case against the hospital
and manufacturer to federal court did not destroy complete diversity. Id. at
*l.
249. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(c) (1) (A)-(G) (West Supp. 1999) (listing information
that should be included in an application for premarket approval of Class
III devices). In practice, fraud may occur by a failure to disclose information required by sub-sections (A) through (G) or by making misleading
statements about this information.
250. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 n.19 (1996).
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The potential also exists for manufacturers to conspire with others
within the industry to enhance success of market penetration. 251 Conspiracy objectives may include: (1) placing medical devices into interstate commerce without proper FDA approval, (2) promotion of a
medical device marketed under the IDE exception as safe and efficacious, and (3) device promotion through deceptive and misleading
conduct. 252
In Wade v. Danek Medical, Inc.,253 although the Eastern District of
Virginia did not have to consider conspiracy claims, the court noted
its intention to follow the court's analysis in Coleman v. Danek Medical
Inc. 254 The dismissal of a claim based solely on a theory of conspiracy
to violate the MDA is warranted because the statute creates no private
right of action. 255 But promotion of a non-FDA-approved, Class III
device through unlawful means, such as through active concealment,
would create a fraud claim recognized by most states. 256 Furthermore, the medical associations remain unshielded by the protection
afforded physicians because a seminar presenter, who happens to be a
physician, is not practicing medicine. 257
251. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL
186325, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (including a discussion of conspiracy
theories, differentiating between a vertical conspiracy among the defendant
and consulting engineers or surgeons from a horizontal conspiracy among
the defendant and similar manufacturers or medical associations).
252. See Coleman v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 629, 630-31 (S.D. Miss.
1998) (citing In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 186325,
at *3 ).
253. 5 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D. Va. 1998).
254. Id. at 383 (referring to the analysis in Coleman v. Danek Medical, Inc., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 1998». The complaint in Wade named as defendants a number of medical associations claiming that they unlawfully conspired with the device manufacturers in the promotion of pedicle screw
fixation devices to medical providers. Id. at 381 & n.1. The court never
reached the conspiracy issue because the case was dismissed as untimely.
Id. at 382.
255. See Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 632; see also Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520
S.E.2d 88, 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (cautioning against interpreting Lohr as
creating an implied private cause of action for MDA violations).
256. See Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 632-33 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screws
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 186325, at *11 and noting that the record contained allegations of several material facts actively concealed at medical association seminars, that some of the instructors had financial incentives to
promote the pedicle screw fixation devices carrying the potential for relaying biased or inaccurate information, and that the lack of FDA approval for
the specific use of this device was withheld).
257. See id. at 633-34 (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 396 exempting the practice of
medicine from the MDA). Section 396 provides: "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care
practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition of disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship." 21 U.S.C. § 396 (1994 & Supp. N 1999).
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Liability Without Fault

Strict liability claims for unreasonably dangerous products or defective designs are likely to survive preemption unless the FDA decides to
dictate specific medical device design standards. 258 The initial fear
raised by Lohr is surely lessened by the learned legal community's
adoption of liability principals in the Restatement (Third).259 The new
Restatement raises the bar for finding manufacturer liability for harm
resulting from the sale or distribution of legally sold and medically
prescribed defective medical devices. 26o
The standard requires the medical device to have "so little merit"
that a reasonable health-care provider would not prescribe the medical device because the defective design renders the device unsafe or
ineffective to any class of patients. 261 The design is not considered
defective even if certain groups of patients would sustain harm by us258. See supra note 186.
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.(1998).
260. See id. § 6. Section 6, entitled "Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor
for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices,"
states:
(a) A manufacturer of a ... medical device who sells or otherwise
distributes a defective ... medical device is subject to liability
for harm to persons caused by the defect. A ... medical device
is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only
pursuant to a health-care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under subsection (a), a ... medical
device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution
the ... medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in
Subsection (c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or
warnings as defined in Subsection (d).
(c) A ... medical device. is not reasonably safe due to defective
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the ... medical
device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the ... medical device for any class of patients.
(d) A ... medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with
the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warning.
[d.

261. See id. § 6 cmt. b. Section 6(b) (1) refers to a manufacturing defect as defined in Section 2(a). The text of section 2(a) appears in its entirety at
infra note 265.
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ing the medical device. 262 By providing adequate warnings of unavoidable risks to medical personnel, the manufacturer is protected.
Patients, through discussion with their physician, are assumed to be
able to make an informed choice as to whether to accept the risk or
seek alternative treatment. 263
In order for a manufacturer to prevail in a liability action, it must
only prove that an informed and reasonable health-care provider
would recommend the particular medical device to at least one patient. 264 Should the manufacturer be unable to meet this minimum
burden, the plaintiff may prevail under a strict liability theory. 265
Strict liability is used based on the theory that plaintiffs have difficulty
proving device defects and negligent manufacturing, and the manufacturer is in a better position to absorb the cost of injury.266
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that strict liability for
defective design does not apply to health-care providers who utilize
these products while rendering medical treatment. 267 Under the
South Carolina statute, "[0] ne who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate
user or consumer .... "268 The decision turned on whether healthcare providers were considered "sellers of products" or "providers of
services" when utilizing devices in the course of rendering medical
treatment. 269 Although the health-care provider recommended the
device and surgical procedure, the product and professional services
were a package deal to the ultimate consumer.270 The consumer was
262.
263.
264.
26S.

266.
267.

268.
269.
270.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b.
See id. § 6 cmt. d.
Id. § 6 cmt. f. (emphasis added).
Section 2(a) states as follows:
§ 2. CATEGORIES OF PRODUCT DEFECT
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product;
Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added).
See id. § 2 cmt. a.
See In re Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., S03 S.E.2d 448, 4S1 (S.C. 1998).
Although finding little opposition to their position, the court cited a Missouri Court of Appeals decision holding that strict liability attaches to anyone, including a hospital, placing the product in the stream of commerce
by sale or any other means. See id. at 4S0 & n.S.
Id. at 447 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § lS-73-10 codifying almost verbatim,
Restatement (Second) § 402A).
Id. at 448 (acknowledging that prior case law found "providers of services"
not strictly liable under the South Carolina Code).
Id. at 449 (following their analysis with a number of supportive leading
cases from other jurisdictions).
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incapable of purchasing the product independent of the surgical service. 271 Likewise, hospitals are insulated from strict liability claims. 272
E.

Causation Issues

The use of expert testimony to prove causation is essential to avoiding summary judgment for many medical device liability claims. 273
Choosing a qualified expert is of utmost importance. 274 In granting
summary judgment the court in Hartwell v. Danek Medical, Inc.,275 determined that expert testimony of two physicians was sufficiently unreliable and therefore inadmissible. 276 This decision was based on the
fact that the expert was not versed in the surgical procedure at issue. 277 In addition, the expert did not personally examine the plaintiff, did not interview the surgeons who performed the procedures
and did not review the radiographic studies. 278 One physician, testifying about an orthopedic procedure, was not even board-certified as an
orthopedic surgeon. 279
Further, the court opined that expert testimony needed to state
proximate causation in terms of reasonable probability.280 It is insufficient to merely testify that the surgery "did not achieve the desired
results.,,281 The expert must discuss other potential causes that were
considered and determined to not feasibly be the proximate cause. 282
Even claims that do not require expert testimony require proof of
causation to sustain the claim. 283 In Coleman v. Danek Medical Inc., the
plaintiff claimed that a defective pedicle screw fixation device attached to the pedicle of her spine caused her physical injuries. 284 In
addition, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants conspired with the
manufacturers to promote, market, and sell the devices to medical
providers. The court granted summary judgment on the fraudulent
27l. Id.
272. Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp., No. CIV.A.92-3180-17, 1993 WL 1156110, at
*2 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 1993).
273. See Darrell L. Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 1,
5-6 (1991).
274. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1999)
(indicating the power of medical expert testimony to prove causation);
Friendship Heights Assoc. v. Koubek, 785 F.2d 1154, 1156-57 (4th Cir.
1986); Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating
that expert testimony is required to establish a standard of medical care
and a violation of that standard).
275. 47 F. Supp. 2d 703 (WD. Va. 1999).
276. Id. at 716.
277. Id. at 708.
278. Id. at 708, 712.
279. Id. at 713.
280. Id. at 707.
28l. Id. at 709.
282. Id.
283. See 63 AM. JUR. 2n Products Liability § 47 (1996).
284. Coleman v. Danek Medical Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 629, 630 (S.D. Miss. 1998).

2001]

Surgically Implanted Medical Device Liability

427

concealment claim because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to
show causation. 285

F.

Statute of Limitation Concerns

Often, a surgically implanted medical device is utilized after the patient sustains an i~ury or disabling disease. For instance, a hip prosthesis may be utilized for a fracture or a pacemaker because of a
slowed heart rate. 286 Even with surgical interventions, symptoms may
not immediately be relieved. 287 It may be some time before the patient realizes that their continued symptoms may be due to a defective
device. 288 In Smith v. Danek Medical, Inc.,289 the plaintiff alleged design defect and argued that the cause of action began to accrue when
the device became dislodged. 290 Following Virginia law, the court determined that the statute of limitations begins to run when the initial
injury is sustained. 291 This fIxes the accrual for dangerous design to
begin at the time of surgical implantation, even if more serious resultant device injury occurs at a later date. 292
Moreover, an allegation of defective device raises the potential for
class action litigation thus creating some additional statute of limitation concerns. In Wade v. Danek Medical, Inc.,293 the court, hearing a
diversity action, decided whether to apply federal or state law regarding equitable tolling of the statute of limitation during the pendancy
of federal products liability litigation. 294 Acknowledging that many
states allow equitable tolling during the pendancy of a class action suit
in their own state, the court indicated that few states have addressed,
and even fewer have allowed "crossjurisdictional" equitable tolling. 295
Finding that Virginia has no interest in furthering the efficiency of
another jurisdiction's class action procedures, and expressing concern
285. [d. at 635.
286. See JOYCE M. BLACK ET. AL., MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING CLINICAL MANAGEMENT FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE 2110-12 (5th ed. 1997).
287. [d.
288. [d.
289. 47 F. Supp. 2d 698 (w'D. Va. 1998).
290. [d. at 701. The plaintiff, a forty-seven-year-old former mechanic, initially
injured his back in 1983 and sustained a re-injury in 1991. [d. at 699. In
1992 at the recommendation of his physician, Mr. Smith underwent spinal
fusion with a Texas Scottish Rites Hospital (TSRH) spinal fixation device, a
device not FDA-approved for use by attachment to the spine pedicles. [d. at
699-700. Although receiving some relief, the surgery was not a complete
success, and in 1994 Mr. Smith began experiencing extreme pain. [d. at
700. A radiographic examination revealed that the TSRH device was no
longer attached to the spine and surgery to remove the device was performed the next day. [d.
291. [d. at 701.
292. See id.
293. 182 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 1999).
294. [d. at 286.
295. [d. at 287.
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about the potential flood of litigation following class action dismissal,
the court determined that Virginia would not adopt a crossjurisdictional tolling rule. 296 Thus, under an Erie analysis, plaintiffs' claims
were time barred following Virginia's "adopted" rule against equitable
tolling. 297
V.

CONCLUSION

Certainly, Lohr provided a divergent path from the previously setded case law regarding preemption of many common-law liability
claims for injuries sustained from medical devices. 298 As with most
legal concepts where intelligent minds differ, the Lohr Court plurality
based their preemption analysis on principles announced by the Supreme Court in prior cases. 299 Within their own analysis, however, the
Court neglected to seriously consider all articulated legislative purposes behind the MDA enactment. 300
The history of food and drug regulation from 1906 to the present
indicates increased legislative concern to control medical device standards to ensure safety. Indeed, safety concerns are the foundation
upon which the Lohr Court based its support for the legislative intent
to provide a remedy to those negatively impacted from device failure. 30l The other legislative goal, to foster innovation, however,
should not be lost in the analysis. 302 The age of computers and artificial materials development provides an opportunity to create an everincreasing number of sophisticated medical devices; devices that may
be more prone to malfunction by virtue of their complexity. The public has the right to expect innovation, and development efforts should
not be unduly hampered by litigation threats. There needs to be a
correct balancing of the risks and benefits, requiring courts to analyze
the federal intent to balance the goal of patient protection against the
need for innovation. 303
Perhaps even more unsetding is the legal community's response to
such a landmark case. 304 Among the cases that follow Lohr, although
acknowledging the differing paths for medical device market entry,
there is litde attention to whether the Lohr "2-prong" or "3-condition"
test is the correct analysis for devices entering through the IDE excep296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 290.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.B.l.
See supra notes 151, 157 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IIA
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
This is especially important for devices under the IDE exception, where
Congress specifically recognizes that experimentation would not be needed
if the safest and most effective devices were already available on the market.
See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part III.D.
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tion or the PMA process. Both IDE and PMA devices traverse a route
far different from the 510(k) process examined in Lohr. Courts need
to consciously decide if extension is appropriate. Even with claims
involving a device marketed through the 510(k) process, the discussion is void of analysis as to regulatory changes, since the Lohr decision, that might impact the outcome.
Specifically, within the Fourth Circuit, the history post-Lohr is devoid of cases regarding devices that have completed the rigorous PMA
process. This result was not unexpected because so few devices fall
outside of one of the PMA exceptions. Courts required to address
liability claims resulting from PMA devices should tread lightly before
applying the Lohr analysis.
Lastly, attention should focus on the response to the principals espoused in the new Restatement. Certainly, many lives are saved by technological advances from medical devices that are more sophisticated.
The increased complexity, however, is often accompanied by graver
consequences when failure occurs. Will the green light provided by
the Restatement (Third) enhance scientific technology by providing a
safety net for the manufacturers to become creative, or will the desire
to protect consumers guide the courts to ensure remedies exist unless
expressly removed by Congress?
Donna M. Senft

